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Abstract
We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descrip-
tions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov
switching in policy-maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been
several changes in Euro-area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance
in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification
and only recovered following the turmoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear
to have been any more conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank
leadership. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that
of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result, although both
‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility
in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers
been able to commit. Adopting a flexible price level target would lead to outcomes close to
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1 Introduction
The ‘Great Moderation’ in output and inflation volatility has been the subject of much analysis,
particularly for the US. Following Sims and Zha (2006) a large literature has emerged which
assesses the extent to which this was simply ‘good luck’ — a favorable shift in shock volatilities
— or ‘good policy’ — a desirable change in monetary policy rule parameters and/or the implicit
inflation target. The improvement in policy making is typically associated with the disinflation
which followed the appointment of Fed Chairman Paul Volcker in 1979.
Relatively few studies consider the Euro-area economy, despite the fact that policy making
within the Euro-area economies has undergone several shifts which could easily be more significant
than those observed for the US Fed (see Cabanillas and Ruscher, 2008). Most obviously these
policy shifts can be seen in the elimination of national monetary policy making in favor of a
single Euro-area monetary authority in the shape of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
associated single currency. However, even prior to the creation of the Euro, Euro-area monetary
policy has undergone a number of significant shifts which could impact on the efficacy of that
policy. For example, the Bundesbank became the de facto leader in monetary policy following the
creation of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1979. Although there were several exchange
rate realignments within the ERM in the early years1, following 1987 the system was relatively
stable until the events surrounding ‘Black Wednesday’ in September 1992. This latter episode has
been associated with tensions between the design of policy appropriate for domestic conditions in
Germany following reunification in 1990 and the needs of other ERM members (see Buiter et al.,
2008). In addition to changes in Germany’s status as leader within the ERM, German monetary
policy has also evolved, particularly during the early to mid 1980s as the Bundesbank developed
its version of ‘pragmatic monetarism’ (Beyer et al., 2008). More recently the monetary policy
leadership role has passed from the Bundesbank to the ECB following the creation of the Euro in
1999. It is therefore interesting to discern whether these events are associated with statistically
and economically significant changes in monetary policy making in the Euro-area economies.
In addition, we would also like to assess whether or not switches in European monetary policy
appear related to those in the US. Favero and Giavazzi (2008) find that European monetary policy
systematically responds to US shocks, while Taylor (2013) argues that, in the years immediately
prior to the financial crisis, central banks often moved in lockstep and that this is potentially
damaging for global monetary policy. It is therefore interesting to assess the degree of synchroni-
1See Ozkan (2003) for a detailed list of these realignments and estimates of their fundamental causes.
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sation of policy across the two economies, and, in particular, if a relaxation in the anti-inflation
stance of the US Fed following the bursting of the dot-com bubble is correlated with similar moves
in Europe.
In order to explore the evolution of Euro-area monetary policy following the formation of
the ERM, we estimate a simple DSGE model under alternative descriptions of flexible inflation
targeting (Svensson, 2003) and instrument rules, after allowing for switches in both the policy
maker’s degree of inflation aversion and shock volatilities. This approach follows that in Chen et
al. (2013) for the US which finds that the Fed is best described as following a time-consistent
discretionary policy with an increase in anti-inflation conservatism associated with the Volcker
disinflation. This enhanced conservatism is then temporarily reduced following the stock-market
crash of 1987, before being lost again following the bursting of the dot-com bubble without
ever being fully regained prior to the financial crisis. In applying this approach to Europe,
it is important to note that prior to the introduction of the Euro, European monetary policy
was actually being conducted by different central banks so that we are measuring the stance
of “average” European monetary policy which will be influenced by both the policies of the
Bundesbank and the extent to which other economies were following Germany’s lead.
We find that Euro-area policy making is also best described by discretionary policy with
several switches in the conservatism of that policy. There is no evidence of the policy maker
being able to act with any degree of commitment. The policy switches cast light on the evolution
of monetary policy making in the Euro-area, how that differs from the US and the extent to
which the ECB can be seen as being a true heir of the Bundesbank. It appears that the Euro-
area achieved its equivalent of the Volcker disinflation around two years after the creation of
the ERM in 1979 with a marked increase in policy conservatism. However, that conservatism
has subsequently been lost on several occasions. Euro-area policy lacked conservatism in the
late 1980s, around the time of German reunification and the subsequent turmoil in the ERM
on ‘Black Wednesday’ in September 1992. There has also been a significant relaxation of policy
conservatism in the years immediately before the launch of the Euro and for much of the first
decade following the Euro’s creation. Therefore, policy switches in the US and Europe seem to
be associated with different events, and movements in European monetary policy are not merely
a reflection of changes in US policy makers’ attitudes towards inflation. Moreover, while both
policy makers appear to have lost conservatism in the period prior to the financial crisis as argued
by Taylor (2013), these reflect quite different policy stances. In the US there is an overshooting
of the inflation target, and in Europe an undershooting which would not have been supported by
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a conservative policy maker in either case.
We then utilise our best-fitting model to undertake various counterfactual analyses of Euro-
area policy making. We find that although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the
moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been
substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. In light of the significant potential
gains to commitment, we consider a range of delegation schemes and alternative simple target
criteria in order to assess how these might bring outcomes closer to those under commitment. A
flexible price level target would be most effective in reaping the benefits of commitment.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Various descriptions of
policy are discussed in Section 3. We then turn to the estimation of the models in Section 4,
and in Section 5 we discuss our results before contrasting them with those obtained for the US.
Section 6 then undertakes various counterfactual simulation exercises which enable us to explore
both the sources and welfare consequences of the ‘Great Moderation’. Section 7 considers the
ability of various delegation schemes and simple target criteria to achieve some of the sizeable
benefits of commitment. We then reach our conclusions in Section 8.
2 The Model
The economy is comprised of households, a monopolistically competitive production sector, and
the government. There is a continuum of goods that enter the households’ consumption basket.
Households form external consumption habits at the level of the consumption basket as a whole,
‘superficial’ habits. Furthermore, we assume the economy is subject to both price and inflation
inertia. Habits and inflation inertia are often employed in empirical applications of the New
Keynesian model.2 While the model extends the benchmark New Keynesian model in this way
to ensure data coherence, beyond this it has deliberately been kept relatively simple to ensure
the assessment of the empirical validity of alternative descriptions of monetary policy remains
transparent. A detailed derivation of the model is given in the online Appendix A.3
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by k and of measure one.
Households derive utility from consumption of a composite good, Ckt =
(∫ 1
0
(
Ckit
)η−1
η di
) η
η−1
where η is the elasticity of substitution between the goods in this basket, and suffer disutility
2See for example Smets and Wouters (2003), and Christiano et al. (2005).
3Hereafter all references to the Appendix refer to the online Appendix.
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from hours spent working, Nkt . Habits are both superficial and external implying that they are
formed at the level of the aggregate consumption good, and that households fail to take account
of the impact of their consumption decisions on the utility of others. To facilitate data-consistent
detrending around a balanced growth path without restricting preferences to be logarithmic in
form, we also follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) and An and Schorfheide (2007) in assuming that
the consumption that enters the utility function is scaled by the economy-wide technology trend,
implying that household’s consumption norms rise with technology as well as being affected by
more familiar habits externalities. Accordingly, households derive utility from the habit-adjusted
composite good,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[(
Ckt /At − θCt−1/At−1
)1−σ
ξt
−σ
1− σ
−
(
Nkt
)1+ϕ
ξt
−σ
1 + ϕ
]
, (1)
where Ct−1 ≡
∫ 1
0 C
k
t−1dk is the cross-sectional average of consumption. Utility is subject to a
time-preference or taste-shock, ξt. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on information
available at time t, β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1) , and σ and ϕ are the inverses of the
intertemporal elasticities of habit-adjusted consumption and labour supply (σ, ϕ > 0; σ = 1).
The process for technology is non-stationary,
lnAt = ln γ + lnAt−1 + ln zt,
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + ε
z
t .
Households decide the composition of the consumption basket to minimise expenditures, and the
demand for individual good i is
Ckit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Ckt ,
where Pit is the price of good i, and Pt =
(∫ 1
0 (Pit)
1−η di
)1−η
is the CES aggregate price index as-
sociated with the composite good consumed by households. By aggregating across all households,
we obtain the overall demand for good i as
Cit =
∫ 1
0
Ckitdk =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Ct. (2)
Households choose consumption Ckt , hours worked, N
k
t , and the portfolio allocation, D
k
t+1, to
maximise expected lifetime utility (1), subject to the budget constraint∫ 1
0
PitC
k
itdi+EtQt,t+1D
k
t+1 =WtN
k
t (1− τ t) +D
k
t +Φt + Tt,
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and the usual transversality condition. The household’s period-t income includes wage income
from providing labour services to goods producing firms,WtN
k
t , which is subject to a time-varying
tax rate, τ t , dividends from the monopolistically competitive firms, Φt, and payments on the
portfolio of assets, Dkt . Financial markets are complete and Qt,t+1 is the one-period stochastic
discount factor for nominal payoffs. Lump-sum transfers, Tt, are paid by the government. The
tax rate, τ t, will be used to finance lump-sum transfers, and can be designed to ensure that
the long-run equilibrium is efficient in the presence of the habits and monopolistic competition
externalities. However, we shall assume that the tax rate fluctuates around this efficient level
such that it’s effect on inflation can be viewed as an autocorrelated cost-push shock.
In the maximisation problem, households take as given the processes for Ct−1, Wt, Φt, and
Tt, as well as the initial asset position D
k
−1. The first order condition for labour is(
Nkt
)ϕ(
Xkt
)−σ = WtPtAt (1− τ t),
and taking expectations, the Euler equation for consumption can be written as
1 = βEt
[(
Xkt+1ξt+1
Xkt ξt
)−σ
At
At+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
Rt,
where habits-adjusted consumption is defined as Xkt ≡ C
k
t /At−θCt−1/At−1 and R
−1
t = Et [Qt,t+1]
denotes the inverse of the risk-free gross nominal interest rate between periods t and t+ 1.
2.2 Firms
We further assume that intermediate goods producers are subject to the constraints of Calvo
(1983) contracts such that, with fixed probability 1− α in each period, a firm can reset its price
and with probability α the firm retains the price of the previous period, but where, following Yun
(1996) that price is indexed to the steady-state rate of inflation. When a firm can set the price, it
can either do so in order to maximise the present discounted value of profits, Et
∞∑
s=0
αsQt,t+sΦit+s,
or it can follow a simple rule of thumb as in Galí and Gertler (1999). The constraints facing the
forward-looking profit maximisers are the demand for their product given by equation (2) and the
constraint that all demand be satisfied at the chosen price. Profits are discounted by the s-step
ahead stochastic discount factor Qt,t+s and by the probability of not being able to set prices in
future periods. The firm’s optimisation problem is
max
{Pit, Yit}
Et
∞∑
s=0
αsQt,t+s [(Pitπ
s −MCt+s)Yit+s] ,
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subject to the demand curve
Yit+s =
(
Pitπ
s
Pt+s
)−η
Yt+s,
where the stochastic discount factor is given by
Qt,t+s = β
s
(
Xt+sξt+s
Xtξt
)−σ Pt
Pt+s
.
The relative price set by firms able to reset prices optimally in a forward-looking manner,
satisfies the following relationship
P ft
Pt
=
η
η − 1
Et
∞∑
s=0
(αβ)s
(
Xt+sξt+s
)−σ
mct+s
(
Pt+sπ
−s
Pt
)η
Yt+s
At+s
Et
∞∑
s=0
(αβ)s
(
Xt+sξt+s
)−σ (Pt+sπ−s
Pt
)η−1
Yt+s
At+s
, (3)
where mct =MCt/Pt is the real marginal cost and P
f
t denotes the price set by all firms who are
able to reset prices in period t and choose to do so in a profit maximising way.
In addition to the familiar Calvo-type price setters, we also allow for inflation inertia. To do so
we allow some firms to follow simple rules of thumb when setting prices. Specifically, when a firm
is given the opportunity of posting a new price, we assume that rather than posting the profit-
maximising price (3), a proportion of those firms, ζ, follow a simple rule of thumb in resetting
that price
P bt = P
∗
t−1πt−1, (4)
such that they update their price in line with last period’s rate of inflation rather than steady-state
inflation, where P ∗t−1 denotes an index of the reset prices given by
lnP ∗t−1 = (1− ζ) lnP
f
t−1 + ζP
b
t−1.
With α of firms keeping last period’s price (but indexed to steady-state inflation) and 1− α
of firms setting a new price, the law of motion of the aggregate price level is
(Pt)
1−η = α (Pt−1π)
1−η + (1− α) (P ∗t )
1−η .
Denoting the fixed share of price-setters following the rule of thumb (4) by ζ, we can derive
a price inflation Phillips curve, as detailed in Leith and Malley (2005). For this we combine the
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rule of thumb of price setters with the optimal price setting described above, leading to the price
Phillips curve
π̂t = χfβEtπ̂t+1 + χbπ̂t−1 + κcm̂ct,
where π̂t = ln(Pt) − ln(Pt−1) − ln(π) is the deviation of inflation from its steady state value,
m̂ct = ln(Wt/Pt)− lnAt − ln((η − 1)/η), are log-linearised real marginal costs, and the reduced
form parameters are defined as χf ≡ α/Φ, χb ≡ ζ/Φ, κc ≡ (1 − α)(1 − ζ)(1 − αβ)/Φ, with
Φ ≡ α(1 + βζ) + (1− α)ζ.
2.3 The Government
The government collects a distortionary tax on labour income which it rebates to households as
a lump-sum transfer. The steady-state value of this distortionary tax will be set at a level which
offsets the combined effect of the monopolistic competition distortion and the effects of the habits
externality, as in Levine et al. (2008) (see also Appendices A and B). However, shocks to the
tax rate described by
ln(1− τ t) = ρ
µ ln(1− τ t−1) + (1− ρ
µ) ln(1− τ)− εµt
serve as autocorrelated cost-push shocks to the NKPC. There is no government spending per se.
The government budget constraint is given by
τ tWtNt = Tt.
2.4 The Complete Model
The complete system of non-linear equations describing the equilibrium are given in Appendix
A. After log-linearising around the deterministic steady state the model can be summarised by
the following set of equations:
σX̂t + ϕN̂t = ŵt − µ̂t, Labor Supply (5)
X̂t = EtX̂t+1 −
1
σ
(
R̂t − Etπ̂t+1 −Etẑt+1
)
− ξ̂t + Etξ̂t+1, Euler Equation (6)
ŷt = N̂t = ĉt Resource Constraint (7)
X̂t = (1− θ)
−1(ĉt − θĉt−1), Habits-Adjusted Consumption (8)
π̂t = χfβEtπ̂t+1 + χbπ̂t−1 + κcŵt, Hybrid NKPC (9)
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ẑt = ρ
z ẑt−1 + ε
z
t , Technology Shock (10)
µ̂t = ρ
µµ̂t−1 + ε
µ
t , Cost-Push Shock (11)
ξ̂t = ρ
ξ ξ̂t−1 + ε
ξ
t , Preference Shock (12)
where µ̂t = τ τ̂ t/ (1− τ) represents autocorrelated fluctuations in the labour income tax rate
which serves as a cost-push shock. The model is then closed through the addition of one of the
descriptions of policy considered in Section 3.
3 Policy
We widen the monetary policy description usually considered in the estimation of DSGE models
from a simple Taylor rule to two forms of optimal policy, namely commitment and discretion.
We also allow for changes in the degree of inflation aversion implied by each form of policy
specification and changes in the volatility of shocks hitting the economy. The best-fitting model
is presented in Section 5 and is then used in the counterfactual analysis presented in Section 6.
3.1 Simple Rule Specification
When Euro-area monetary policy is described as a generalised Taylor rule, we specify this rule
following An and Schorfheide (2007) as
R̂t = ρ
RR̂t−1 + (1− ρ
R)[ψ1π̂t + ψ2(∆ŷt + ẑt)] + ε
R
t , (13)
where the monetary policy maker adjusts interest rates in response to movements in inflation
and deviations of output growth from trend.4 Much of the literature on estimated policy rules
finds that there have been significant changes in the conduct of policy over time. Our simple
rule-based estimation also takes this into account by allowing for either changes in the policy
maker’s inflation target or rule parameters. In the former case, following Sims and Zha (2006),
we allow the inflation target to follow a two-state Markov-switching process. In the latter case,
when the policy changes are described as shifts in rule parameters (ρRst , ψ1,st , ψ2,st) between two
regimes, we adopt the procedure developed by Farmer et al. (2011) to solve the model with
Markov-switching in simple rule parameters.
In addition to incorporating monetary policy changes, we also account for the ‘good luck’
factor that, following Sims and Zha (2006), is modelled as a decrease in the volatility of shocks
4Rules of this form have not only been found to be empirically useful, but, when suitably parameterized, can
often mimic optimal policy, see, for example, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
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hitting the economy. Therefore, we allow for independent regime switching in the variances of
the four shocks (i.e. σz, σµ, σζ and σR) between high and low shock volatility regimes.
3.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
Our estimation of optimal policy regimes considers the cases of commitment and discretion, the
former allowing the policy maker to make promises concerning their future actions as in a standard
Ramsey policy problem and the latter being constrained to be time-consistent. Estimating such
optimal policies is clearly dependent on the form of objective function we adopt. An obvious
benchmark for such an exercise would be the micro-founded welfare function based on the utility of
the households populating our economy.5 However, such a micro-founded welfare function implies
extreme inflation aversion to the extent that the micro-founded weight attached to inflation can
be over 100 times that attached to the output terms (see Woodford, 2003, Ch.6). Optimal
policies which were based on such a strong anti-inflation objective are likely to be inconsistent
with observed inflation volatility. Therefore, for estimation, we assume that the policy maker
possesses an objective function of this form, but where the weights on the various terms are freely
estimated. We also allow the policy maker to have a desire to smooth their policy instrument,
and estimate the extent to which this is the case. This is in common with much of the literature,
see Ilbas (2010), Givens (2012) and Le Roux and Kirsanova (2013).
The resulting objective function for estimation is given by
Lest = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
 ω1
(
X̂t + ξ̂t
)2
+ ω2
(
ŷt −
σ
ϕ ξ̂t
)2
ωπ,st
(
π̂2t +
ζα−1
(1−ζ) [π̂t − π̂t−1]
2
)
+ ω3
(
∆R̂t
)2
 . (14)
This objective function can, following the terminology of Svensson (2003), be interpreted as
the central bank’s ‘general targeting rule’. Conditional on the extent to which they possess
a commitment technology, these objectives are then translated into a ‘specific targeting rule’
obtained by minimising them subject to the description of the economy. Therefore, our approach
amounts to a flexible application of Svensson’s (2003) notion of targeting rules where the central
bank may choose to attach non-microfounded weights to welfare-relevant policy targets.
Under the optimal policy specification we consider potential policy shifts in the form of
switches in the weight given to the inflation stabilisation term. Specifically, we allow the weight
on inflation, ωπ,st , to be subject to regime shifting between one and a value lower than one,
to capture periods where policy is less conservative. Therefore, we can identify periods where
5See Appendix C.
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Euro-area policy makers have adopted different attitudes towards inflation over time, for example
during the development of ERM and subsequent adoption of the Euro. We adopt the algorithm
developed by Svensson and Williams (2007) that solves optimal monetary policies in Markov
jump-linear-quadratic systems. The algorithm implies that although policy makers can antici-
pate any changes in their objectives, they do not attempt to tie the hands of their future selves
by altering today’s policy plan as part of a strategic game. We consider that this description
of evolving policy preferences is in line with the conduct of Euro-area policy, particularly since
policy making has been dominated by the Bundesbank and, subsequently, the ECB, both of which
enjoy instrument independence.
Finally, as with the model based on simple rules, we allow for independent regime switching
in variances of shocks under optimal policy, i.e. σz, σµ, and σζ .
4 Data, Priors and Identification
4.1 Data
Our empirical analysis uses the aggregate euro area data on output growth (∆GDPt), annualised
domestic inflation (INFt) and nominal interest rates (INTt) from 1979Q1 up to 2008Q3.
6 All
data are seasonally adjusted and at quarterly frequencies. Output growth is the log difference of
real GDP, multiplied by 100. Inflation is the log difference of GDP deflator, scaled by 400. All
data are taken from the AWM database from the ECB (see Fagan et al., 2001).7
The data are linked to the recursive equations obtained by solving the model under either a
simple rule or optimal policy through a measurement equation specified as: ∆GDPtINFt
INTt
 =
 γQ +∆ŷt + ẑtπA + 4π̂t
rA + πA + 4γQ + 4R̂t
 , (15)
where parameters, γQ, πA and rA represent the values of output growth, inflation and interest
rates when the economy is in its steady state. The average real interest rate, rA, is linked
to the discount factor, β, such that β =
(
1 + rA/400
)−1
. For the simple rule with a Markov-
switching inflation target, πA fluctuates between high πH and low πL inflation targets. Due to the
presence of Markov-switching parameters, the likelihood function is approximated using Kim’s
6We have also considered the implications of estimating the model over alternative sample sizes, either beginning
in the early 1970s or the start of Maastricht Treaty in 1994. This does not affect our conclusions. These results
are available upon request.
7The specific data series used are the short-term interest rate — STN, Real Gross Domestic Product — YER and
GDP Deflator — YED.
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(1994) filter, and then combined with the prior distribution to obtain the posterior distribution.
A random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is then used to generate 2,500,000 draws from the
posterior distribution with the first 1,000,000 draws being discarded and every 50th draw from
the remaining draws being saved.8
Finally, we compute the log marginal likelihood values for each model to provide a coherent
framework within which to compare models with different types of monetary policy. We imple-
ment the commonly used modified harmonic mean estimator of Geweke (1999) for this task. We
also utilise the approach of Sims et al. (2008) as a robustness check. The latter is designed for
models with time-varying parameters, where the posterior density may be non-Gaussian.
4.2 Prior Distributions
The priors are presented in Table 1 and are common across all models. These are set to be
broadly consistent with the literature on the estimation of New Keynesian models. For example,
the mean of the Calvo parameter, α, is set so that average length of the contract is around one
year. Following Smets and Wouters (2003), we choose the normal distribution for inverse of the
Frisch labour supply elasticity, ϕ, and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
σ, with both priors having a mean of 2.5. Habits formation, indexation and the AR(1) parameters
of the technology, cost-push, and taste shock processes are assumed to follow a beta distribution
with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.15. Standard deviations of shocks are chosen
to be highly dispersed inverted Gamma distributions, and the priors for shock variances are set
to be symmetric across regimes.
For the model featuring a simple rule subject to Markov-switching in the rule parameters, the
priors for these are set in line with Bianchi (2013). The priors of rule parameters on output growth
and the interest rate smoothing terms are set to be symmetric across regimes, while asymmetric
priors are chosen for the coefficients on inflation. For the simple rule with a Markov-switching
inflation target, the priors of inflation targets, πA and πH , are set in line with Schorfheide (2005).
Finally, for optimal policy, the relative weights (i.e. ω1, ω2 and ω3) in the objective function are
assumed to follow beta distributions, and ωπ is allowed to switch between a normalised value of
1 and a value lower than 1, the beta distribution is used for the latter with a mean of 0.5.
8Geweke (1992) convergence diagnostics indicate that convergence is achieved. These are available upon request.
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4.3 Identification
The identification test of Iskrev (2010) confirms that the fixed parameter versions of our models
closed with either a simple rule or optimal policy are identifiable.9 In addition, the Bayesian
learning rate indicator, proposed by Koop et al. (2013), is also applied to our models with
Markov-switching in policy and shock variance parameters. Although this indicator does not
deliver a ‘Yes/No’ answer to the question of whether a given parameter is identified as in Iskrev
(2010), it indicates the degree of identification. In Appendix D, we present the results obtained
by using this indicator on Markov switching parameters. It shows that our models are reasonably
well identified.
5 Results
This section presents our estimation results. The posterior means and the 90% confidence intervals
are presented in Table 2. Each column corresponds to an alternative policy description, with
the columns ordered according to log marginal likelihood values calculated using Geweke (1999)
and Sims et al. (2008), respectively. The first column of results in Table 2 is for the best-fitting
model, which is a time-consistent discretionary policy, followed by a simple rule with switching in
rule parameters, commitment, and then another simple rule with switches in the inflation target.
Table 2 also reports the Bayes factor for each alternative model relative to discretion. In this
case, using Kass and Raftery (1995) adaptation of Jeffreys (2007) criteria for quantifying the
evidence in favor of one model rather than another, the evidence in favor of discretion over simple
rules is ‘decisive’.10,11 Therefore, the estimation suggests that there is no significant degree of
commitment within Euro-area monetary policy.
We now contrast the results obtained when monetary policy is described by a simple interest
rate rule, with those generated when policy is based on either discretion or commitment. We
then turn to consider the estimated switches in policy and shock volatility within the Euro-area,
contrasting these with comparable estimates for the US, and related studies for Europe.
9When considering identification in the context of a fixed parameter model we set ωπ = 1 under discretion and
commitment policy and assume that the Taylor principle is satisfied when monetary policy is described as a simple
rule. Our main results, however, allow for switches in the degree of conservatism and rule parameters.
10Following Jeffreys (2007), Kass and Raftery (1995) argue that values of the Bayes Factor associated with two
models lying between 0 and 3.2 constitutes evidence which is ‘not worth more than a bare mention’, between 3.2
and 10 is ‘substantial’ evidence, between 10 and 100 is ‘strong’ evidence and above 100 is ‘decisive’ evidence.
11 In Appendix E we explore, in more detail, why discretionary policy is better able to fit the data than ei-
ther simple or more general ad hoc rules despite the fact that optimal policy implies significant cross-equation
restrictions.
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5.1 Structural Parameter Estimates
If we consider individual parameter estimates obtained under the conventional interest rate rule,
then our results are broadly in line with other studies: in the case of the rule with switches in rule
parameters we estimate an intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ = 2.72; a measure of price
stickiness, α = 0.737, implying that price contracts typically last for one year; a relatively modest
degree of price indexation, ζ = 0.065, a sizeable estimate of the degree of habits, θ = 0.757 and
an inverse Frisch labour supply elasticity of ϕ = 2.478.12
Moving from these estimates obtained under a conventional interest rate rule to the case of
optimal policy under discretion, the deep parameter estimates remain largely the same, except
that there is a moderate decline in the degree of habits in the model, which falls to θ = 0.638, and
an increase in the degree of indexation in price setting to ζ = 0.159. At the same time, where the
simple rule relies on preference shocks (both in terms of their standard deviation and persistence)
to explain the volatility in the data, the estimates obtained when assuming time-consistent policy
significantly raise the estimated size and persistence of cost-push shocks in order to fit the data.13
These subtle shifts in estimated parameters across discretion and simple rules reflect the nature
of the optimal policy problem, and the need for the estimated parameters under optimal policy to
generate a meaningful trade-off for the policy maker which can account for the observed volatility
of output, inflation and the policy instrument.14 Accordingly, there is more emphasis on inflation
inertia and cost-push shocks under discretionary policy, relative to a simple rule. Moving to
commitment policy means that the policy maker is no longer subject to the stabilisation bias,
and the estimated variance and persistence of cost-push shocks are higher. Again, this is to help
the model achieve a meaningful trade-off for the policy maker and, thereby, explain the observed
movements in output and inflation data. Despite this, as we shall see below in Section 6, the
commitment policy is simply too effective in stabilising the economy, particularly in terms of
inflation, to be a reasonable description of the data.
12Similar parameter estimates are obtained for the rule with switches in the inflation target.
13When comparing the estimated cost-push shock process with others in the literature it is important to note
that our cost-push shock enters the Phillips curve with the reduced form coefficient κc, which lies in the range
0.1-0.3 across our estimates.
14The benchmark New Keynesian model only contains a meaningful tradeoff between output gap and inflation
stabilization in the face of cost-push shocks, see Woodford (2003, Ch.6). Our model also contains a habits externality
which means that preference and technology shocks also imply interesting policy trade-offs — see Leith et al. (2012)
for a discussion — which are further modified by the presence of inflation inertia.
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5.2 Switches in Monetary Policy Conservatism and Shock Volatility
We now turn to consider how the policy making process has changed over time. We find that for
all monetary policy specifications considered, we are able to identify a ‘less conservative’ inflation
targeting regime. Under commitment and discretion, this less conservative regime is characterised
by lowering the weight on inflation stabilisation from 1 to 0.271 and 0.547, respectively. Under the
simple rule, the less conservative regime is captured by either a lower coefficient on excess inflation
when rule parameters are allowed to switch, or a higher inflation target.15 The probability of
observing the less conservative regime over the sample period is shown in Figure 1. The adoption
of the ERM in 1979 does not appear to have immediately resulted in a switch in the conservatism
of policy. However, sometime afterwards policy making does appear to have achieved a higher
degree of conservatism. The exact timing of this switch is dependent on the description of the
policy embodied in the estimation. For example, under the rule-based policy, a higher degree of
conservatism is seen to emerge around the time of the hardening of the ERM in 1987. Conversely,
our data-preferred estimates based on discretionary policy-making reveal far more pronounced
shifts in policy making throughout the entire sample period. From the mid-1980s Euro-area
monetary policy appears to lose conservatism, with the peak loss occurring at the same time as
German reunification in early 1990. This is despite the fact that other ERM economies at the time
criticised the German authorities for pursuing an aggressively tight monetary policy - in response
to the fiscal expansion and wage deals offered in East Germany as part of reunification - which
they felt was harming their economies.16 To the extent that the Euro-area wide data are capturing
German monetary leadership in this period, it suggests that perhaps the Bundesbank was not so
insensitive to the needs of their ERM/Euro-area partners as is often suggested. Similarly, in the
run-up to the creation of the Euro, the estimates suggest that policy gradually lost conservatism.
Finally, following the creation of the Euro, the ECB seems to have gone through a sustained loss
of conservatism which would not be so apparent under other descriptions of policy.
The probability of being in the high volatility regime is also shown in Figure 1. It shows
broadly similar patterns of high volatility regime in the early years of the ERM. There are
then additional periods of high shock volatility, but where the exact timing and duration of these
episodes varies across the different descriptions of policy. In all cases volatility is reduced following
15 It is interesting to note that in the estimated less conservative regime the interest rate rule still satisfies the
Taylor principle with a coefficient on excess inflation of ψ1 = 1.16.
16Buiter et al. (2008) quote tense exchanges between the British Chancellor Norman Lamont and Bundesbank
President Helmut Schlesinger as the former repeatedly asked the latter for a commitment to cut German interest
rates at a Euromeeting in Bath on 5th and 6th September 1992.
14
the resolution of tensions in the ERM in August 1993 and does not re-emerge until the financial
crisis at the end of the sample period.
We now turn to explore the nature of the policy problem driving the identification of pol-
icy regimes under discretion. Under discretion the policy maker is trading off the state of the
real economy against inflation, and the fluctuations in conservatism identify shifts in the policy
maker’s view of that trade-off. In order to explore exactly which aspects of the data are causing
the estimation under discretion to label particular periods as being more or less conservative,
we construct a welfare relevant output gap. Normally the social planner’s allocation would be
obtained by maximising utility subject to resource and technology constraints. However, in order
to generate insight into our policy maker’s decisions we need to consider the estimated objective
function. That is we wish to contrast the actual allocation to that which would be chosen by a so-
cial planner with preferences which are consistent with those we estimated, and who is subject to
the relevant resource and technology constraints. Therefore we minimise the following objective
function
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ω1
(
X̂∗t + ξ̂t
)2
+ ω2
(
ŷ∗t −
σ
ϕ
ξ̂t
)2}
, (16)
which is derived from the second order approximation to household utility, after substituting both
the resource constraint and production function, ŷ∗t = N̂
∗
t = ĉ
∗
t , but where the weights on each
term are as estimated above. The definition of habits adjusted consumption is given by
X̂∗t = (1− θ)
−1(ŷ∗t − θŷ
∗
t−1),
where the star superscripts denote the fact that we are considering a form of social planner’s
allocation. The first order condition from this problem can be written as
θβω1
(1− θ)2
Etŷ
∗
t+1 =
[
ω1
(1− θ)2
+ ω2 +
θ2βω1
(1− θ)2
]
ŷ∗t −
ω1θ
(1− θ)2
ŷ∗t−1
+
[
ω1
1− θ
−
ω2σ
ϕ
−
θβω1ρξ
1− θ
]
ξ̂t.
This describes the desired path for output ŷ∗t that would be chosen by the social planner. Using
this as a benchmark we construct the welfare relevant output gap ŷt − ŷ
∗
t which captures the
extent to which the policy maker is unable to achieve this desired level of output due to nominal
inertia, the habits externality and time-consistency problems. Effectively, it reflects the welfare
trade-offs between inflation and the real economy implied by the estimated objective function
and decentralised equilibrium, but captures them in a single measure.
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The first row of Figure 2 plots the probability of the policy maker in Europe being less
conservative alongside the output and inflation gaps, where the latter are simply the difference
between inflation and its steady-state/target value. Here we can see that the initial period of less
conservative regime is associated with very high inflation, albeit with a sizeable negative output
gap. This then switches in late 1982 to being a more conservative regime as inflation falls, while
the negative output gap is maintained. The subsequent gradual loss of conservatism peaking
around the time of German reunification is a period where inflation is stuck above target, and
although the output gap is negative it is not sufficiently so for the policy to be labelled ‘more
conservative’. It is only when the output gap widens sufficiently that the policy maker is identified
as being conservative around mid-1993. Subsequently this episode of enhanced conservatism is
maintained as inflation moves closer to target allowing the output gap to decline. The loss of
conservatism immediately prior to the introduction of the Euro and in the early years of the Euro
is then quite different as inflation is consistently below the target and is associated with a positive
output gap. A more conservative policy maker would have adopted a more expansive monetary
policy raising inflation towards target at the price of a larger positive output gap. Therefore, the
lack of conservatism in the early years of the ERM is due to a failure to reduce inflation, while
during the early years of the Euro it is a failure to raise inflation to target.
Comparison with the US
We can contrast the timing of policy switches identified for the Euro Area with those obtained
in Chen et al. (2013) for the US. Figure 2 contrasts the smoothed probabilities of less conservative
policy regimes for both the Euro-area and US, in rows 1 and 2, respectively. Interestingly, the
German-led disinflation in Europe appears to occur not long after that experienced in the US
under Volcker. However, subsequent periods of lost conservatism in Europe appear to be more
likely linked to developments in the ERM, including those associated with German reunification,
and the desire for stability in the run-up to the formation of the Euro, rather than following
the ‘Greenspan put’ where the US relaxed its policy stance following the stock market crash of
1987 and bursting of the dot-com bubble. However, both policy makers appeared to operate less
conservative monetary policies during the relatively benign conditions that preceded the financial
crisis. The possibility that these, and other, monetary policy makers were collectively deviating
from desirable policies is stressed by Taylor (2013) as a key factor leading to the financial crisis.
We can further investigate the differences between the evolution of policy in the US and Europe
by constructing the same measures of inflation and output gaps for the US which are plotted in
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the second row of Figure 2. This shows that following the appointment of Paul Volcker as US
Fed Chairman, the major losses in conservatism were associated with developments in financial
markets: the stock market crash of 1987 and the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000. In
both cases there was an increase in inflation above target, and the output gap was insufficiently
negative for the policy maker to be described as being ‘more conservative’. This is in contrast
to the lost conservatism in the Euro area immediately before and after the introduction of the
Euro where policy was identified as being ‘less conservative’ as a result of failing to raise inflation
towards the estimated target, despite the presence of a positive output gap. Therefore, the two
policy makers underwent a similar disinflation process in the early 1980s, which was undermined
by events surrounding German reunification in Europe and financial market turbulence in 1987
and 2000 in the US, respectively. In contrast, European policy appears less conservative before
and after the introduction of the Euro not because of an unwarranted increase in inflation, but
because of a failure to raise inflation towards the target as aggressively as a ‘more conservative’
policy maker would do.
In terms of episodes of high shock volatility across the US and Europe, see Figure 3, we
find that in Europe volatility was high until a few years after the 1992 ERM crisis. In contrast,
estimates for the US suggest that the reduction in shock volatilities occurred a decade earlier
around 1985. There is no evidence in Europe for the episode of high volatility observed in the US
following the bursting of the dot-com bubble, possibly reflecting both the location of the major
dot-com firms and differences in the structure of financial markets across the US and Europe.
Finally, at the end of the sample period, in both the US and Euro-area the global financial crisis
is associated with a rise in shock volatility, although, interestingly, the high shock volatilities
emerge first in the US before manifesting themselves in Europe.
Comparison with other European Studies
The literature on the Great Moderation in Europe is largely based on reduced-form estimates
and contains mixed results on the nature of the Great Moderation in Europe. For example,
Cabanillas and Ruscher (2008) specifically explore this issue in the Euro-area and argue that
it is due to both good luck, and also substantial improvements in the conduct of monetary
policy. However, the exact timing of these changes is not formally estimated, as the authors
explore volatility measures over pre-defined sub-samples. Nevertheless, individual studies do echo
elements of our results. Rubio-Ramírez et al. (2005) find, using a Markov switching Structural
VAR, that the Great Moderation in the Euro-area is largely due to a reduction in shock volatilities
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which are dated to occur around 1993, similar to our findings. Canova et al. (2008), using a time-
varying VAR find that there is limited evidence of structural shifts in the economy, although there
have been sizeable changes in the volatilities of structural shocks. Our analysis in Section 6 does
not attribute all the Great Moderation in Europe to good luck, although it does find that this is
a very significant component.
Trecroci and Vassalli (2010) estimate time-varying interest rate rules for the US, UK, Ger-
many, France and Italy. In the case of Germany they find a strengthening of the anti-inflation
policy stance in the early 1980s which is then relaxed around the time of German reunification,
consistent with our findings. Finally, Assenmacher-Wesche (2005) estimates monetary policy re-
action functions for the US, UK and Germany allowing for switches in the rule parameters and
residual variances. Her estimates suggest that Germany is in a low inflation regime between 1983
and 1990, only returning to that regime in 1996. Again, this is not dissimilar to the timing of the
more conservative regime observed under our preferred policy description.
Therefore, our analysis appears to pick up features of the data which have been captured across
a range of less structural empirical studies, even if none of these individual studies captures all
of the nuances of shock volatility and policy switches, unlike our approach.
6 Good Luck versus Good Policy
Our best-fitting model is obtained under discretionary policy with Markov switching in the weight
on inflation stabilisation in the policy maker’s objectives, as well as switches in the volatility of
shocks hitting the economy. This allows us to undertake various counterfactual exercises. For
example, using this model we can measure how much ‘good luck’ or ‘good policy’ alone can
stabilise volatilities in the Euro-area output and inflation.
We compute the unconditional variances of key variables, as well as unconditional welfare
under alternative counterfactuals. These values computed under the worst case scenario serve as
the benchmark for the ‘good luck’ versus ‘good policy’ debate. This benchmark implies being in
the high shock volatility regime in conjunction with discretionary policy with the lower level of
estimated conservatism, ωπ = 0.547. We can then consider the extent to which ‘good policy’ or
‘good luck’ alone would be able to stabilise inflation, output and interest rates. Table 3 shows
that under discretion an increase in central bank conservatism alone (ωπ = 1) would reduce by
more than half the volatility in inflation and interest rates implied by the worst case scenario,
although with only a negligible impact on output volatility. In contrast, under ‘good luck’ there
is an additional reduction in output volatility. Therefore, it is good luck that achieves bigger
18
gains in terms of welfare.
Turning to the second half of Table 3 we consider the same experiment, but now assume that
policy is conducted under commitment. In the absence of ‘good luck’, the ability to act with
commitment can allow central banks to almost completely stabilise inflation volatility, but at the
cost of moderate increases in output fluctuations. It is also important to note that outcomes are
clearly improved regardless of whether or not the estimated increase in central bank conservatism
takes place. This result suggests that the reduction in inflation volatility achieved by being able to
act under commitment is such that the issue of conservatism becomes of second-order importance.
Therefore, the dimension of ‘good policy’ we should be concerned with is not the anti-inflation
conservatism of the central bank, but rather that they have the tools and credibility to effectively
pursue a commitment policy and make time-inconsistent promises which they will keep.
7 Alternative Delegation Schemes and Targeting Criteria
As shown above the gains to commitment are significant for the Euro area. However, the em-
pirical analysis finds that there is no evidence of such commitment. Therefore, in this section
we turn to consider whether similar gains can be achieved through either alternative delegation
schemes which do not pre-suppose an ability to behave in a time-inconsistent manner or simple
target criteria where the latter are a means of communicating the central bank’s policy without
articulating either a simple instrument rule or the full Ramsey policy.
7.1 Revealed Preferences
In designing our optimal delegation schemes and targeting criteria we need to take a stand on the
welfare metric we employ to obtain the appropriate weights within each description of the central
bank remit. We assume that in periods where the policy maker was found to be conservative, ωπ
= 1, society was employing a ‘conservative’ central banker as in Rogoff (1985) to optimise the
outcomes under discretion. This assumption implies that the outcomes of discretionary monetary
policy under our conservative regime are as good as they can be under inflation targeting. We
would then like to see whether alternative delegation schemes would further improve the outcomes
under discretionary monetary policy to bring us closer to the level of welfare achieved under com-
mitment. Therefore to design other optimal delegation schemes, we backward-engineer society’s
preferences from those estimated for the ‘conservative’ central banker. This would imply that the
latter has a higher degree of inflation conservatism than that of society, whose preferences are
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where the ‘revealed preference’ weight on inflation stabilisation, given our estimated model pa-
rameters, is calculated to be ωrp = 0.206. This weight implies that it is optimal for society
to delegate monetary policy to a conservative central banker with a weight on inflation of 1 and
weights on other elements of welfare, ω1, ω2 and ω3 as estimated. Therefore, to reiterate, we have
constructed a ‘revealed preference’ measure of social welfare which assumes that the anti-inflation
conservatism of the central banker whose preferences we estimated was chosen optimally.
7.2 Delegation Schemes
Several delegated targets have been considered in the literature and typically replace the inflation
target with an alternative target which introduces some of the inertial behavior that makes
commitment so effective. We consider a flexible target for nominal GDP growth (Jensen, 2002)
and the price level (Vestin, 2006). Following the financial crisis there have been renewed calls
to consider such delegation schemes, particularly as policy has become mired at the zero lower
bound (ZLB). For example, Woodford (2012) advocates nominal income targeting as means of
generating desirable policy expectations when policy is mired at the ZLB, while Coibion et al.
(2012) suggest that rather than raise the inflation target to reduce the risk of hitting the ZLB, a
price level target would generate far greater welfare benefits.
Of particular importance in defining the optimal delegation scheme is the extent of any in-
flation inertia in the model. Vestin (2006) shows that in the absence of such inertia, price level
targeting can come close to mimicking the outcomes under commitment.17 However, as the level
of inflation inertia is increased the advantages of all such delegation schemes are reduced, particu-
larly that of price level targeting (see Walsh, 2003). Since the time-consistency problem is driven
by economic agents’ expectations of the inflationary consequences of policy, it is clear that mak-
ing the Phillips curve purely backward looking will negate any of the expectational advantages
offered by any of these schemes. The source of the shocks hitting the economy is also important
in ranking these delegation schemes - nominal income targeting performs relatively well when
the shocks hitting the economy create a trade-off between output and inflation stabilisation for
the monetary policy maker i.e. cost push shocks. In contrast, technology shocks which typically
17 In fact, with iid shocks, price level targeting can be shown to be isomorphic to the full commitment solution
when the New Keynesian Phillips curve is purely forward-looking.
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require a strong monetary policy response, which ensures they do not have any inflationary con-
sequences, would give rise to a sub-optimally weak policy response under nominal income growth
targeting. Taken together, this implies that the ranking of these alternative delegation schemes
is an empirical question, which our estimated model is well placed to address.
Therefore, in addition to inflation targeting we also consider price level and nominal income
targeting schemes. For them we use the revealed preference measure of social welfare (17) to
optimally choose the weights on the price level and nominal income targets, while retaining the
estimated weights on the real terms, ω1, ω2, and ω3, such that the delegated objectives under
price level targeting are the following
Lp = E0
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t=0
βt
 ω1
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X̂t + ξ̂t
)2
+ ω2
(
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σ
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2
t + ω3
(
∆R̂t
)2
 ,
where p̂t = p̂t−1 + π̂t, while for nominal income growth targeting, the objective function is given
by
LNI = E0
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where ŷt − ŷt−1 + zt + π̂t captures the growth in nominal GDP relative to its trend. Using the
‘revealed preference’ objective function to optimally choose the weights under each delegation
scheme implies that the price level target is very flexibly applied (the weight on the optimised
price level term is 0.01.), while the weight on nominal income growth is 0.70.18
7.3 Targeting Criteria
As an alternative to delegated targets, Woodford (2007) suggests that many central banks com-
municate their approach to flexible inflation targeting by adopting a simple target criteria of the
form
π̂t = −φ1ŷt,
which captures the bank’s desire to gradually eliminate the output gap as inflation converges
towards target. We label this ‘Target Criterion 1’ and it would be consistent with the form of
18 In contrast to the ‘revealed preference’ objective function, designing optimal delegation schemes using micro-
founded social welfare implies a very aggressive response to inflation with inflation and price level targets (with
weights of 347 and 370, respectively) effectively resulting in strict inflation targeting. However, nominal income
growth targeting cannot mimic strict inflation targeting, which implies that it does not perform as well as the
others in minimizing welfare losses and the weight on the nominal income growth target only rises to 4.66.
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the optimal discretionary policy undertaken by a conservative central bank in the context of the
simple New Keynesian model. Woodford (2007) argues that central banks may be able to improve
outcomes, relative to such an approach, by adopting a target criterion which adds an element of
price level control
π̂t = −φ2∆ŷt,
which would be the target criterion under commitment in the benchmark New Keynesian model,
‘Target Criterion 2’. Summing this criterion over time implies that the output gap will only be
eliminated if the sum of inflation deviations are zero, such that the policy maker stabilises not
just inflation, but the price level itself, following shocks. We shall explore whether these target
criteria offer an alternative means of achieving outcomes close to commitment when embedding
them in our estimated model. It should be noted that the form of these criteria is motivated
by the optimal policy exercises in the context of the simple New Keynesian model which does
not contain the habits, inflation inertia or the desire to smooth the policy instrument which is a
feature of our estimated model. The reason for applying them in our richer model is that they
may serve as a relatively simple way of communicating the essence of flexible inflation targeting
and commitment even although they do not fully capture the detail of Ramsey policy. Optimally
choosing the parameters of these target criteria using the revealed preference measure (17) yields
target criteria 1 (π̂t = 0.1223ŷt) and 2 (π̂t = −7.986∆ŷt). Interestingly, the inertial elements of
our richer model results in optimised Target Criterion 1 placing the opposite sign on the output
gap than would be implied in a simpler model.
7.4 Macroeconomic Outcomes and Welfare Ranking
The macroeconomic outcomes under each of these delegation schemes, optimally designed using
the revealed preference measure of social welfare are shown in Figure 4. All delegation schemes
appear to reduce inflation in the early 1980s. The most effective delegation scheme would have
been a price level target, albeit with a very low weight on the price level target implying a great
deal of flexibility.
Similarly, we can assess the performance of the two target criteria in stabilising the economy in
Figure 5. The two target criteria are very successful in stabilising inflation. However, while such
policies are appropriate in the benchmark New Keynesian model for which they are designed, they
are far too aggressive in the context of our richer model with inflation inertia, habits, a desire to
smooth interest rates and a realistic trade-off between stabilising inflation and the real economy.
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This can be seen when comparing Figures 4 and 5. Significantly larger output losses are found
when these two targeting criteria are used compared to the delegation schemes. Their failure
to improve welfare highlights the dangers of transplanting strong results from simple models to
richer environments.
This is confirmed in Table 4 which presents welfare measures and output, inflation and interest
rate variances under the high and low volatility regimes. Here nominal income growth targets are
clearly the least successful delegated target in terms of inflation volatility, and this is reflected
in their welfare performance. Therefore, while inflation targeting performs relatively well, price
level targeting comes closest to achieving the welfare levels attained under commitment. Figure
6 illustrates how close the price level targeting delegation scheme can mimic commitment. This
also implies that this delegation scheme is not just appropriate for good times, but would have
yielded substantial benefits under the high shock volatility regime of the early 1980s too.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we explore the implications of describing policy using two notions of optimal policy,
discretion and commitment, when estimating a DSGE model of the Euro-area economy. Our
estimates strongly suggest that the data-preferred description of Euro-area policy is that policy
makers operate under discretion with several shifts in both the conservatism of monetary policy
and the volatility of shocks hitting the economy. These estimates reveal features of the evolution
of Euro-area policy making that are not so readily apparent from estimates based on describing
policy with a conventional simple rule. Specifically, the Euro-area achieved its equivalent of
the Volcker disinflation around two years after the creation of the ERM in 1979 with a marked
increase in policy conservatism and associated fall in inflation. However, that conservatism has not
been maintained throughout the rest of the sample period. At the time of German reunification
and the subsequent turmoil in the ERM around ‘Black Wednesday’ in September 1992, Euro-
area policy lost conservatism. Given that German policy makers were often criticised at the
time for conducting an excessively tight monetary policy which reflected their concerns over the
inflationary consequences of German re-unification without making concessions to the needs of
their ERM partners, this relaxation in policy at the time is striking. There also has been further
temporary losses in conservatism a few years before the launch of the Euro and for much of the
first decade of the Euro’s existence. This latter period of reduced conservatism coincides with a
similar episode in the US prior to the financial crisis as stressed in Taylor (2013). However, there
is an asymmetry in that the estimations find that while the US was failing to respond aggressively
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to rises in inflation above target at this time, European policy makers were not acting to raise
inflation which had fallen below target. Other switches in policy preferences in Europe do not
obviously reflect developments in the US which, post-Volcker, appear to capture responses to
volatility in stock markets.
Based on estimates from our best-fit model we re-assess the ‘Great Moderation’ in the Euro-
area and find that both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a part in reducing inflation volatility.
However since increased conservatism implies output losses are the price for this reduction in
inflation, the welfare gains from good luck are substantially higher. When we considered what
would have happened had policy makers had the ability to commit, then, even without any
changes in shock volatilities or anti-inflation conservatism, the welfare gains would be huge and
a delegated price level target would have captured many of these gains.
24
References
An, S. and F. Schorfheide (2007). Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models. Econometric Reviews 26
(2-4), 113–172.
Assenmacher-Wesche, K. (2005). Estimating Central Banks’ Preferences from a Time-Varying
Empirical Reaction Function. European Economic Review 50 (8), 1951–1974.
Beyer, A., V. Gaspar, C. Gerberding, and O. Issing (2008). Opting Out of the Great Inflation:
German Monetary Policy after the Breakdown of Bretton Woods. Paper prepared for the NBER
Great Inflation Conference Woodstock.
Bianchi, F. (2013). Regime Switches, Agents’ Beliefs, and Post-World War II U.S. Macroeconomic
Dynamics. Review of Economic Studies 80(2), 491–511.
Buiter, W. H., G. M. Corsetti, and P. A. Pesenti (2008). Interpreting the ERM crisis: Country
Specific and Systemic Issues. Princeton Studies in International Finance, No. 84.
Cabanillas, L. G. and E. Ruscher (2008). The Great Moderation in the Euro Area: What Role
have Macroeconomic Policies Played? European Economy, Economic Papers 331.
Calvo, G. (1983). Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximising Framework. Journal of Monetary
Economics 12, 383–398.
Canova, F., L. Gambetti, and E. Pappa (2008). The Structural Dynamics of Output Growth and
Inflation: Some International Evidence. Economics Journal 117, C167–C191.
Chen, X., T. Kirsanova, and C. Leith (2013). How Optimal is US Monetary Policy? University
of Glasgow Working Paper.
Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum, and G. Evans (2005). Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects
of a Shock to Monetary Policy. Journal of Political Economy 113 (1), 1–45.
Coibion, O., Y. Gorodnichenko, and J. Wieland (2012). The Optimal Inflation Rate in New
Keynesian Models: Should Central Banks Raise their Inflation Targets in Light of the ZLB?
Review of Economic Studies 79, 1371–1406.
Fagan, G., J. Henry, and R.Mestre (2001). An area wide model (awm) for the Euro Area. European
Central Bank Working Paper no. 42.
25
Farmer, R. E. A., D. F. Waggoner, and T. Zha (2011). Minimal State Variable Solutions to
Markov-switching Rational Expectations Models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
35(12), 2150–2166.
Favero, C. and F. Giavazzi (2008). Should the Euro Area be Run as a Closed Economy? American
Economic Review 98 (2), 138–145.
Galí, J. and M. Gertler (1999). Inflation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric Analysis. Journal
of Monetary Economics 44, 195–222.
Geweke, J. (1992). Evaluating the accuracy of sampling-based approaches to calculating posterior
moments. In J. O. Berger, J. M. Bernardo, A. P. Dawid, and A. F. M. Smith (Eds.), Proceedings of
the Fourth Valencia International Meetings on Bayesian Statistics, pp. 169–194. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Geweke, J. (1999). Using simulation methods for Bayesian econometric models: inference, devel-
opment, and communication. Econometric Reviews 18 (1), 1–73.
Givens, G. E. (2012). Estimating Central Bank Preferences under Commitment and Discretion.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 44 (6), 1033–1061.
Ilbas, P. (2010). Estimation of monetary policy preferences in a forward-looking model: a Bayesian
approach. International Journal of Central Banking 6 (3), 169–209.
Iskrev, N. (2010). Local identification in DSGE models. Journal of Monetary Economics 52(7),
189–202.
Jeffreys, H. (2007). Theory of Probability (3 ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jensen, H. (2002). Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation? American Economic Review
92 (4), 928–956.
Kass, R. E. and A. E. Raftery (1995). Bayes Factors. Journal of the American Statistical Asso-
ciation 90 (430), 773–795.
Kim, C.-J. (1994). Dynamic linear models with Markov-switching. Journal of Econometrics 60,
1–22.
Koop, G., M. H. Pesaran, and R. P. Smith (2013). On Identification of Bayesian DSGE Models.
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 31 (3), 300–314.
26
Le Roux, S. and T. Kirsanova (2013). Commitment vs. Discretion in the UK: An Empirical
Investigation of the Monetary and Fiscal Policy Regime. International Journal of Central Banking
9 (4), 99–151.
Leith, C. and J. Malley (2005). Estimated General Equilibrium Models for the Analysis of Mon-
etary Policy in the US and Europe. European Economic Review 49(8), 2137–2159.
Leith, C., I. Moldovan, and R. Rossi (2012). Optimal Monetary Policy in a New Keynesian Model
with Habits in Consumption. Review of Economic Dynamics 15 (3), 416–435.
Levine, P., P. McAdam, and J. Pearlman (2008). Quantifying and sustaining welfare gains from
monetary commitment. Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 1253–1276.
Lubik, T. and F. Schorfheide (2005). A Bayesian Look at the New Open Economy Macroeco-
nomics. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005, pp. 313–379.
Ozkan, G. F. (2003). Explaining ERM Realignments: Insights from Optimising Models of Cur-
rency Crises. Journal of Macroeconomics 25(4), 491–507.
Rogoff, K. (1985). The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (4), 1169–1189.
Rubio-Ramírez, J. F., D. Waggoner, and T. Zha (2005). Markov Switching Structural Vector
Autoregressions: Theory and Applications. Federal Reserve of Atlanta Working Paper No. 2005-
27.
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe (2007). Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal
Rules. Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (6), 1702–1725.
Schorfheide, F. (2005). Learning and Monetary Policy Shifts. Review of Economic Dynamics 8,
392–419.
Sims, C. A., D. F.Waggoner, and T. Zha (2008). Methods for inference in large multiple-equation
Markov-switching models. Journal of Econometrics 146, 113–144.
Sims, C. A. and T. Zha (2006). Were There Regime Switches in US Monetary Policy. American
Economic Review 96 (1), 54–81.
Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2003). An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model
of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economic Association 1 (1), 1123–75.
27
Svensson, L. and N. Williams (2007). Monetary Policy with Model Uncertainty: Distribution
Forecast Targeting. CEPR Discussion Papers 6331, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Svensson, L. E. O. (2003). What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary
Policy through Targeting Rules. Journal of Economic Literature 41 (2), 426–477.
Taylor, J. B. (2013). International monetary coordination and the great deviation. Journal of
Policy Modeling 35, 463–472.
Trecroci, C. and M. Vassalli (2010). Monetary Policy Regime Shifts: New Evidence from Time-
Varying Interest Rate Rules. Economic Inquiry 48 (4), 933–950.
Vestin, D. (2006). Price-level versus inflation targeting. Journal of Monetary Economics 53(7),
1361–1376.
Walsh, C. (2003). Speed Limit Policies: The Output Gap and Optimal Monetary Policy.American
Economic Review 93 (1), 265–278.
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Prince-
ton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.
Woodford, M. (2007). Forecast Targeting as a Monetary Policy Strategy: Policy Rules in Practice.
In E. F. Koenig, R. Leeson, and G. A. Kahn (Eds.), The Taylor Rule and the Transformation of
Monetary Policy.
Woodford, M. (2012). Methods of Policy Accommodation at the Interest-Rate Lower Bound.
Proceedings of the Economic Policy Symposium in Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City.
Yun, T. (1996). Nominal price rigidity, money supply endogeneity, and business cycles. Journal
of Monetary Economics 37 (2-3), 345–370.
28
Figure 1: Markov Switching Probabilities - Policy and Volatility Switches
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Figure 2: Output and inflation gaps vs. less conservative regime
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Notes: Solid line denotes output and inflation gaps (left scale) and the dashed line denotes the
probability to be in the less conservative regime (right scale).
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Figure 3: Low Volatility Regime in the Euro Area and the US
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Notes: Solid line denotes output and inflation gaps (left scale) and the dashed line denotes the
probability to be in the less conservative regime (right scale).
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Figure 4: Counterfactuals: Alternative Delegation Schemes (Revealed Preferences)
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Notes: Lower panel plots the difference between output attained if the policy maker implements
the optimally designed delegation schemes using the revealed preference welfare function, and the
output from our estimated model under the discretionary policy presented in Table 2.
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Figure 5: Counterfactuals: Two Target Criteria (Revealed Preferences)
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Notes: Lower panel plots the difference between output attained if the policy maker implements
the optimally designed target criteria using the revealed preference welfare function, and the
output from the estimated model under discretionary policy presented in Table 2.
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Figure 6: Counterfactuals: Commitment versus Discretion (Revealed Preferences)
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Notes: Lower panel plots the difference between output attained if the policy maker implements
the optimally designed inflation, price level targeting or commitment policy using the revealed
preference welfare function, and the output from our estimated model under the discretionary
policy presented in Table 2.
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Table 1: Distribution of Priors
Parameters Range Density Mean Std Dev
inv. of intertemp. elas. of subst. σ R Normal 2.50 0.25
Calvo parameter α [0, 1) Beta 0.75 0.02
inflation inertia ζ [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
habit persistence θ [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
inverse of Frisch elasticity ϕ R Normal 2.50 0.25
AR coeff., taste shock ρξ [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
AR coeff., cost-push shock ρµ [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
AR coeff., productivity shock ρz [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
steady state interest rate rA R+ Gamma 3.5 2
inflation target πA R+ Gamma 3.5 2
steady state growth rate γQ R Normal 0.52 1
Markov Switching s.d. of shocks
taste shocks σξ(s=1=2) R
+ Inv. Gamma 0.50 5
cost-push shocks σµ(s=1=2) R
+ Inv. Gamma 0.50 5
productivity shocks σz(s=1=2) R
+ Inv. Gamma 0.50 5
policy shocks σR(s=1=2) R
+ Inv. Gamma 0.50 5
Markov switching rule parameters
interest rate smoothing ρR(S=1=2) [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.25
inflation (strong inflation targeting) ψ1(S=1) R
+ Gamma 1.50 0.50
inflation (weak inflation targeting) ψ1(S=2) R
+ Gamma 1.0 0.50
output ψ2(S=1=2) R
+ Gamma 0.50 0.25
Weights on Objectives
gap term, Xˆt − ξˆt ω1 [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
gap term, yˆt −
σ
ϕ ξˆt ω2 [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
change in interest rate, ∆R̂t ω3 [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
inflation, π̂2t +
ζα−1
(1−ζ) [π̂t − π̂t−1]
2 ωπ(S=2) [0, 1) Beta 0.50 0.15
Markov switching in Inflation Target
inflation target (S = 1) πA(S=1) R
+ Gamma 3 2
inflation target (S = 2) πA(S=2) R
+ Gamma 6 2
Transition Probabilities
policy: remaining with strong infl. targeting p11 [0, 1) Beta 0.90 0.05
policy: remaining with weak infl. targeting p22 [0, 1) Beta 0.90 0.05
volatility: remaining with low volatility q11 [0, 1) Beta 0.90 0.05
volatility: remaining with high volatility q22 [0, 1) Beta 0.90 0.05
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Table 2: Estimation Results - Switches in Policy and Volatility
Parameters Discretion Rule - Parameters Commitment Rule - Target
Model Parameters
σ 2.822
[2.466,3.185]
2.726
[2.337,3.113]
2.857
[2.514,3.211]
2.720
[2.332,3.104]
α 0.756
[0.729,0.783]
0.737
[0.704,0.769]
0.779
[0.755,0.803]
0.745
[0.677,0.815]
ζ 0.159
[0.068,0.249]
0.065
[0.021,0.108]
0.148
[0.057,0.234]
0.079
[0.027,0.130]
θ 0.638
[0.459,0.833]
0.757
[0.589,0.929]
0.668
[0.508,0.837]
0.681
[0.450,0.917]
ϕ 2.242
[1.828,2.646]
2.478
[2.068,2.891]
2.278
[1.884,2.673]
2.461
[2.049,2.880]
Shock Processes
ρξ 0.850
[0.818,0.882]
0.916
[0.883,0.949]
0.905
[0.874,0.938]
0.930
[0.902,0.959]
ρµ 0.962
[0.945,0.980]
0.495
[0.243,0.742]
0.986
[0.976,0.996]
0.496
[0.241,0.739]
ρz 0.266
[0.179,0.353]
0.342
[0.222,0.462]
0.282
[0.194,0.367]
0.376
[0.234,0.516]
σξ(s=1) 0.518
[0.316,0.716]
0.689
[0.405,0.962]
0.425
[0.280,0.566]
0.539
[0.322,0.758]
σξ(s=2) 0.641
[0.408,0.865]
0.739
[0.525,0.943]
0.945
[0.565,1.307]
0.795
[0.446,1.112]
σµ(s=1) 0.275
[0.188,0.356]
0.377
[0.134,0.607]
1.368
[0.644,2.017]
0.3513
[0.1323,0.570]
σµ(s=2) 0.600
[0.411,0.783]
0.642
[0.278,1.018]
1.743
[1.185,2.438]
0.600
[0.283,0.916]
σz(s=1) 0.326
[0.273,0.379]
0.343
[0.287,0.397]
0.290
[0.244,0.335]
0.338
[0.277,0.397]
σz(s=2) 0.661
[0.529,0.788]
0.802
[0.592,1.006]
0.629
[0.521,0.736]
0.735
[0.535,0.935]
σR(s=1) — 0.121
[0.105,0.138]
— 0.125
[0.105,0.145]
σR(s=2) — 0.314
[0.226,0.398]
— 0.306
[0.214,0.394]
Data Means
rA 1.157
[0.612,1.685]
1.096
[0.653,1.535]
1.123
[0.582,1.651]
0.538
[0.434,0.638]
πA(S=1) 2.819
[2.139,3.500]
3.269
[2.759,3.779]
2.390
[1.953,2.788]
2.927
[2.182,3.646]
πA(S=2) — — — 3.716[2.873,4.562]
γQ 0.496
[0.409,0.581]
0.536
[0.449,0.623]
0.504
[0.416,0.593]
0.538
[0.434,0.638]
continued on the next page
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Table 2: Estimation Results - Switches in Policy and Volatility — continued
Parameters Discretion Rule - Parameters Commitment Rule - Target
Policy Parameters
ρR(S=1) — 0.812[0.773,0.851]
— 0.798
[0.754,0.842]
ρR(S=2) — 0.536
[0.395,0.679]
— —
ψ1(S=1) — 2.025
[1.733,2.312]
— 1.542
[1.228,1.883]
ψ1(S=2) — 1.159
[1.053,1.269]
— —
ψ2(S=1) — 0.485
[0.399,0.572]
— 0.722
[0.364,1.078]
ψ2(S=2) — 0.281
[0.206,0.353]
— —
ω1 0.300
[0.131,0.467]
— 0.482
[0.314,0.648]
—
ω2 0.712
[0.558,0.868]
— 0.581
[0.400,0.760]
—
ω3 0.627
[0.426,0.833]
— 0.659
[0.475,0.845]
—
ωπ(S=1) 1 — 1 —
ωπ(S=2) 0.547
[0.405,0.690]
— 0.271
[0.130,0.406]
—
Markov Transition Probabilities
p11 0.898
[0.839,0.957]
0.958
[0.925,0.990]
0.964
[0.932,0.997]
0.915
[0.848,0.981]
p22 0.933
[0.888,0.983]
0.890
[0.820,0.958]
0.939
[0.894,0.987]
0.828
[0.743,0.918]
q11 0.925
[0.875,0.978]
0.947
[0.915,0.983]
0.941
[0.900,0.984]
0.944
[0.907,0.982]
q22 0.945
[0.905,0.987]
0.868
[0.791,0.946]
0.946
[0.907,0.987]
0.887
[0.810,0.966]
Log Marginal Data Densities and Bayes Factors
Geweke (1999) −367.407
(1.00)
−375.859
(4.68e+3)
−380.455
(4.64e+5)
−384.169
(1.91e+7)
Sims et al. (2008) −367.556
(1.00)
−376.089
(5.07e+3)
−381.484
(1.12e+6)
−384.673
(2.71e+7)
Notes: For each parameter the posterior distribution is described by mean and 90% confidence
interval in square brackets. Bayes Factors for marginal data densities are in parentheses. Compu-
tation of the qL statistic of Sims et al. (2008), which assesses the overlap between the weighting
matrix and the posterior density, indicates that the calculated marginal log likelihoods are reliable
in every case.
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Table 3: Unconditional Variances and Welfare under Alternative Policies and Volatilities
Regime:
(conservatism, volatility)
Output Inflation Interest Rate Welfare Cost
(est. weights)
Welfare Cost
(micro. weights)
Discretion
(low, high) 0.258
[0.149,0.405]
1.739
[1.226,2.655]
1.168
[0.700,2.060]
2.599
[1.464,4.856]
0.85%
[0.52%,1.32%]
(high, high) 0.255
[0.155,0.412]
0.712
[0.381,1.089]
0.478
[0.317,0.861]
2.494
[1.392,4.740]
0.38%
[0.20%,0.61%]
(low, low) 0.139
[0.093,0.216]
1.002
[0.731,1.461]
0.520
[0.326,0.951]
1.370
[0.687,3.117]
0.33%
[0.20%,0.50%]
(high, low) 0.125
[0.081,0.197]
0.424
[0.239,0.620]
0.232
[0.163,0.389]
1.358
[0.681,3.083]
0.15%
[0.08%,0.26%]
Commitment
(low, high) 0.320
[0.199,0.470]
0.137
[0.097,0.198]
0.560
[0.428,0.803]
2.033
[0.980,4.274]
0.15%
[0.10%,0.22%]
(high, high) 0.298
[0.187,0.454]
0.064
[0.042,0.093]
0.543
[0.426,0.756]
2.094
[1.026,4..309]
0.10%
[0.06%,0.16%]
(low, low) 0.172
[0.118,0.256]
0.099
[0.071,0.144]
0.447
[0.338,0.603]
1.146
[0.551,2.818]
0.09%
[0.05%,0.14%]
(high, low) 0.152
[0.100,0.223]
0.048
[0.031,0.067]
0.442
[0.339,0.562]
1.170
[0.568,2.837]
0.06%
[0.04%,0.10%]
Notes: The figures in the first three columns measure the unconditional variances of output,
inflation and interest rates for estimated parameters in regime (conservatism, volatility). The
welfare cost using estimated weights is computed using equation (14). The welfare costs using
micro-founded weights is based on the derivation in online Appendix C but is expressed as a per-
centage of steady-state consumption. For both commitment and discretionary policy we compute
social welfare using regimes and regime parameters identified for discretionary policy.
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Table 4: Unconditional Variances and Welfare under Alternative Delegation
Schemes (Revealed Preferences)
Policy Target Output Inflation Interest Rate Welfare Cost
(revealed weights)
High Volatility
Commitment 0.365
[0.218,0.551]
0.382
[0.274,0.561]
0.523
[0.405,0.765]
1.932
[0.928,4.199]
Price Level 0.307
[0.180,0.487]
0.437
[0.310,0.664]
0.484
[0.391,0.676]
1.947
[0.937,4.210]
Inflation 0.255
[0.155,0.412]
0.712
[0.381,1.09]
0.478
[0.317,0.862]
2.137
[1.040,4.355]
Nominal Income 0.252
[0.155,0.404]
0.963
[0.534,1.543]
0.639
[0.406,1.183]
2.196
[1.122,4.398]
Target Criterion1 0.297
[0.193,0.448]
0.004
[0.004,0.007]
0.297
[0.225,0.386]
2.276
[1.175,4.486]
Target Criterion2 0.208
[0.119,0.345]
0.069
[0.051,0.092]
0.322
[0.225,0.386]
2.241
[1.141,4.445]
Low Volatility
Commitment 0.221
[0.143,0.335]
0.274
[0.194,0.380]
0.408
[0.308,0.562]
1.100
[0.515,2.776]
Price Level 0.182
[0.113,0.279]
0.296
[0.201,0.439]
0.365
[0.290,0.495]
1.105
[0.517,2.781]
Inflation 0.125
[0.081,0.197]
0.424
[0.239,0.620]
0.232
[0.163,0.389]
1.166
[0.571,2.850]
Nominal Income 0.127
[0.083,0.197]
0.558
[0.338,0.818]
0.298
[0.196,0.548]
1.183
[0.585,2.866]
Target Criterion1 0.133
[0.092,0.209]
0.002
[0.001,0.003]
0.241
[0.182,0.297]
1.291
[0.646,2.928]
Target Criterion2 0.093
[0.058,0.158]
0.031
[0.024,0.041]
0.252
[0.195,0.308]
1.279
[0.635,2.911]
Notes: The table shows the unconditional variances of output, inflation and interest rates under
Inflation (ωπ = 1), Nominal Income (ωNI = 0.7) and Price Level (ωp = 0.01) targeting, and
target criterion 1 (π̂t = 0.1223ŷt) and 2 (π̂t = −7.986∆ŷt). These have been optimally designed
using the revealed preference welfare function (17). The welfare costs in the final column are
computed using the revealed preference weights.
39
Online Appendix to Paper:
An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy in the
Euro Area
Xiaoshan Chen ∗
University of Durham
Tatiana Kirsanova†
University of Glasgow
Campbell Leith‡
University of Glasgow
July 13, 2017
∗Address: Durham University Business School, University of Durham, Durham, DH1 3LB; xi-
aoshan.chen@durham.ac.uk
†Address: Economics, Adam Smith Business School, Gilbert Scott Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow
G12 8QQ; e-mail tatiana.kirsanova@glasgow.ac.uk
‡Address: Economics, Adam Smith Business School, Gilbert Scott Building, University of Glasgow, Glasgow
G12 8QQ; e-mail campbell.leith@glasgow.ac.uk
1
A The Complete Model
The complete system of non-linear equations describing the equilibrium are given by
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1−η
lnAt = lnγ + lnAt−1 + ln zt
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + ε
z
t
lnµt = ρµ lnµt−1 + ε
µ
t
ln ξt = ρξ ln ξt−1 + ε
ξ
t
ln(1− τ t) = ρ
µ ln(1− τ t−1) + (1− ρ
µ) ln(1− τ)− εµt
with an associated equation describing the evolution of price dispersion, ∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
di,
which is not needed to tie down the equilibrium upon log-linearisation. The model is then closed
with the addition of a description of monetary policy, which will either be rule based, or derived
from various forms of optimal policy discussed in the main text.
In order to render this model stationary we need to scale certain variables by the non-
stationary level of technology, At such that kt = Kt/At whereKt = {Yt, Ct,Wt/Pt}. All other real
variables are naturally stationary. Applying this scaling, the steady-state equilibrium conditions
1
reduce to:
NϕXσ = w(1− τ)
1 = βRπ−1/γ = βr/γ
y = N = c
X = c(1− θ)
η
η − 1
=
1
w
.
This system yields
Nσ+ϕ (1− θ)σ = w(1− τ). (1)
which can be solved for N . Note that this expression depends on the real wage w, which can
be obtained from the steady-state pricing decision of our monopolistically competitive firms. In
Appendix B we contrast this with the labour allocation that would be chosen by a social planner in
order to fix the steady-state tax rate required to offset the net distortion implied by monopolistic
competition and the consumption habits externality.
B The Social Planner’s Problem
The subsidy level that ensures an efficient long-run equilibrium is obtained by comparing the
steady state solution of the social planner’s problem with the steady state obtained in the decen-
tralised equilibrium. The social planner ignores the nominal inertia and all other inefficiencies
and chooses real allocations that maximise the representative consumer’s utility subject to the
aggregate resource constraint, the aggregate production function, and the law of motion for habit-
adjusted consumption:
max
{X∗
t
,C∗
t
,N∗
t
}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (X∗t , N
∗
t , ξt, At)
s.t. Y ∗t = C
∗
t
Y ∗t = AtN
∗
t
X∗t = C
∗
t /At − θC
∗
t−1/At−1
The optimal choice implies the following relationship between the marginal rate of substi-
tution between labour and habit-adjusted consumption and the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution in habit-adjusted consumption
(N∗t )
ϕ (X∗t )
σ = (1− θβ)Et
(
X∗t+1ξt+1
X∗t ξt
)−σ
.
2
The steady state equivalent of this expression can be written as
(N∗)ϕ+σ (1− θ)σ = (1− θβ) .
If we contrast this with the allocation achieved in the steady-state of our decentralised equi-
librium given by equation (1), we can see that the two will be identical whenever the tax rate is
set optimally to be
τ∗ ≡ 1−
η
η − 1
(1− θβ).
Notice that in the absence of habits the optimal tax rate would be negative, such that it is
effectively a subsidy which offsets the monopolistic competition distortion. However, for the
estimated values of the habits parameter the optimal tax rate is positive as the policy maker
wishes to prevent households from overconsuming.
C Derivation of Objective Function
Individual utility in period t is
Γ0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
X1−σt ξ
−σ
t
1− σ
−
N1+ϕt ξ
−σ
t
1 + ϕ
)
where Xt = ct − θct−1 is habit-adjusted aggregate consumption after adjusting consumption for
the level of productivity, ct = Ct/At.
Linearisation up to second order yields
Γ0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
X
1−σ
{
1− θβ
1− θ
(
ĉt +
1
2
ĉ2t
)
−
1
2
σX̂2t − σX̂tξ̂t
}
−N
1+ϕ
{
N̂t +
1
2
(1 + ϕ) N̂2t − σN̂tξ̂t
})
+ tip(3).
where where tip(3) includes terms independent of policy as well as terms of third order and higher.
For every variable Zt with steady state value Z we denote Ẑt = log(Zt/Z).
The second order approximation to the production function yields the exact relationship
Nˆt = ∆ˆt + yˆt , where yt = Yt/At and ∆t =
1∫
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
di. We substitute Nˆt out and follow Eser
et al. (2009) in using
∞∑
t=0
βt∆ˆt =
α
1− αβ
∆ˆ−1 +
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
αη
(1− βα)(1− α)
(
π̂2t +
ζα−1
(1− ζ)
[π̂t − π̂t−1]
2
)
3
to yield
Γ0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
X
1−σ
{
1− θβ
1− θ
(
ĉt +
1
2
ĉ2t
)
−
1
2
σX̂2t − σX̂tξ̂t
}
−N
1+ϕ
(
ŷt +
1
2
αη
(1−βα)(1−α)
(
π̂2t +
ζα−1
(1−ζ) [π̂t − π̂t−1]
2
)
+12 (1 + ϕ) ŷ
2
t − σŷtξ̂t
) + tip(3).
The second order approximation to the national income identity yields
ĉt +
1
2
ĉ2t = ŷt +
1
2
ŷ2t + tip (3) .
Finally, we use that in the efficient steady-state X
1−σ
(1 − θβ) = (1 − θ)N
1+ϕ
and collect
terms to arrive at
Γ0 = −
1
2
N
1+ϕ
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
σ (1− θ)
1− θβ
(
X̂t + ξ̂t
)2
+ ϕ
(
ŷt −
σ
ϕ
ξ̂t
)2
+
αη
(1− βα)(1− α)
(
π̂2t +
ζα−1
(1− ζ)
[π̂t − π̂t−1]
2
)}
+ tip (3) .
After normalising the coefficient on inflation to one, we can write the microfounded objective
function as,
Lmicro = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
 Φ1
(
X̂t + ξ̂t
)2
+Φ2
(
ŷt −
σ
ϕ
ξ̂t
)2
+
(
π̂2t +
ζα−1
(1−ζ) [π̂t − π̂t−1]
2
)
 , (2)
where the weights on the two real terms are functions of model structural parameters, where
Φ1 =
σ(1−θ)
1−θβ
(1−βα)(1−α)
αη and Φ2 =
ϕ(1−βα)(1−α)
αη .
D A Bayesian Learning Rate Indicator
This section applies the Bayesian learning rate indicator proposed by Koop et al. (2013) to check
the degree of parameter identification under discretion, commitment, and the simple rule with
Markov switching rule parameters in Table 2. This indicator does not propose a ‘Yes/No’ answer
to the question of whether a given parameter is identified. However, it indicates the degree of
identification. This indicator is developed on the basis of Bayesian asymptotic theory. As sample
size increases, the role of the prior vanishes and the posterior of the parameter asymptotically
converges to its true value.
The advantage of this indicator is that it can be easily applied to models with Markov-
switching parameters, since it requires only a few additional steps during an ordinary Bayesian
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estimation. However, applying this indicator requires prior knowledge that a subset of model
parameters is known to be identifiable. Therefore, we rely on results obtained using Iskrev (2010)
that the fixed parameter versions of our model closed with either a simple rule or optimal policy
are identifiable.
In developing this indicator Koop et al. (2013) assume Gaussian priors to obtain analytical
solution of posterior precision when the sample period reaches infinity. However, for most DSGE
models, the priors are non-Gaussian. Therefore, the exact expression of posterior precision is
different from those illustrated in Koop et al. (2013). In applying this indicator to a DSGE
model, Caglar et al. (2011) suggest treating the Hessian at the posterior mode as the measure
of posterior precision. The technical details of this indicator can be found in Koop et al. (2013).
Here, we focus on how this indicator is applied to our Markov switching models.
Let θ = [θi, θu]
′ be a vector of model parameters, with the assumption that θi is known to
be identified, while the identification of θu is under question. Prior to applying the Bayesian
learning rate indicator, we use Iskrev (2010) to determine how we split the model parameters
into θi and θu. θu includes parameters that are associated with Markov switching in policy, shock
variances and parameters in the transition matrix. These parameters cannot be incorporated in
the Iskrev (2010) test. For both commitment and discretion θu = [p11, p22, q11, q22, σξ(s=1,2),
σµ(s=1,2), σz(s=1,2), ωπ(S=2)], while for the simple rule with Markov-switching rule parameters θu
= [p11, p22, q11, q22, σξ(s=1,2), σµ(s=1,2), σz(s=1,2), σR(s=1,2), ψ1(S=1,2), ψ2(S=1,2), ρ
R
(S=1,2)].
1
To implement this indicator, we simulate samples of artificial data from each models. Models
with Markov-switching parameters complicate the data generating processes (DGPs). To simulate
data from a Markov-switching model, we need to set the model parameters and the probabilities
of each regime. We set model parameters equal to posterior means in Table 2. Unlike when
using a fixed parameter model to generate datasets as discussed in Koop et al. (2013) and Caglar
et al. (2011), we cannot generate a single large dataset and then take subsets of it to produce
smaller samples. This is because probabilities of different sample sizes have to correspond to the
estimated transition probabilities (p11, p22, q11, q22).
We generate data samples with T = 100, 1000, 10000 and 20000. In order to ensure our
implementation of this indicator is as comparable as possible across models, we use the same seed
for the random number generator for DGPs in each case.
Tables D1, D2 and D3 present the normalised posterior precision of parameters included in θu
under discretion, commitment and a simple rule. As discussed in Koop et al. (2013), we observe
1We set ωπ(S=1) = 1, therefore ωπ(S=1) is not included in θu under optimal policy.
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that posterior precision need not rise monotonically with T. The posterior precision may, in fact,
fall before rising depending on prior type. However, Koop et al. (2013) show that the normalised
posterior precision of an unidentified parameter will shrink to zero very quickly as T increases.
To make our results robust, we double our sample size from T = 10000, the largest sample size
used in Koop et al. (2013) to T = 20000. It can be seen that none of the normalised posterior
precision in θu collapse to zero when T = 20000. This indicates that our model parameters are
reasonably well identified.
Table D1: Posterior precision divided by sample size (Discretion)
Parameters n = 100 n = 1000 n = 10000 n = 20000
Parameters associated with the MS mechanism
ωπ(S=2) 5.246 3.280 1.355 0.733
σξ(s=1) 2.022 3.584 2.938 2.778
σξ(s=2) 2.969 0.959 1.628 1.505
σµ(s=1) 7.324 8.812 5.512 7.017
σµ(s=2) 4.447 1.151 1.768 1.815
σz(s=1) 7.628 8.525 4.567 8.475
σz(s=2) 4.480 1.210 1.704 1.645
p11 8.244 1.692 1.735 1.274
p22 35.245 11.901 3.209 1.804
q11 19.865 2.834 4.836 5.573
q22 12.903 15.956 10.427 11.448
Table D2: Posterior precision divided by sample size (Commitment)
Parameters n = 100 n = 1000 n = 10000 n = 20000
Parameters associated with the MS mechanism
ωπ(S=2) 8.262 4.963 4.195 2.766
σξ(s=1) 1.171 1.770 4.881 2.657
σξ(s=2) 3.405 1.184 0.857 0.817
σµ(s=1) 0.154 0.207 0.383 0.318
σµ(s=2) 0.506 0.226 0.251 0.152
σz(s=1) 2.969 12.158 11.467 9.317
σz(s=2) 4.175 2.602 3.618 2.113
p11 6.023 20.369 20.935 16.786
p22 15.055 14.846 8.503 5.381
q11 10.221 13.311 10.774 8.300
q22 2.451 12.749 14.382 12.000
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Table D3: Posterior precision divided by sample size (simple rule)
Parameters n = 100 n = 1000 n = 10000 n = 20000
Parameters associated with the MS mechanism
ρR(S=1) 27.191 30.109 29.181 29.731
ρR(S=2) 2.089 1.469 1.852 3.036
ψ1(S=1) 0.538 0.573 0.409 0.504
ψ1(S=2) 0.717 1.558 1.764 1.777
ψ2(S=1) 2.042 0.605 0.237 0.258
ψ2(S=2) 2.636 0.697 0.304 0.327
σR(s=1) 48.769 63.814 70.160 67.808
σR(s=2) 6.584 6.019 4.348 5.173
σξ(s=1) 1.518 1.967 2.483 2.380
σξ(s=2) 1.007 0.907 0.776 0.703
σµ(s=1) 1.025 0.238 0.015 0.016
σµ(s=2) 0.286 0.041 0.006 0.008
σz(s=1) 9.299 8.299 9.649 10.309
σz(s=2) 1.035 1.019 0.761 1.047
p11 36.516 21.990 11.710 15.341
p22 5.293 3.395 3.785 4.816
q11 8.116 9.110 11.263 11.229
q22 3.379 2.246 1.762 2.015
E Implicit Interest Rate Rule
This section outlines how, in principle, we can construct an interest rate rule underpinning dis-
cretion, and estimates that rule without imposing the cross-equation restrictions implied by dis-
cretion.
There are numerous ways of representing the policy rules implied by discretion, which will
rarely be unique, even although the equilibrium implied by discretionary policy will be. To
consider potential functional forms of an instrument rule we employ the following Lagrangian
representation of the policy problem under discretion:
L =
1
2
 ω1
(
(1− θ)−1(ŷt − θŷt−1) + ξ̂t
)2
+ ω2
(
ŷt −
σ
ϕ ξ̂t
)2
ωπ,st
(
π̂2t +
ζα−1
(1−ζ) [π̂t − π̂t−1]
2
)
+ ω3
(
∆R̂t
)2
+ βEtVt+1
+λ1t
[
(1− θ)−1(ŷt − θŷt−1)− (1− θ)
−1(Etŷt+1 − θŷt)
+ 1σ
(
R̂t − Etπ̂t+1 − Etẑt+1
)
+ (1− ρ)ξ̂t
]
+λ2t [π̂t − χfβEtπ̂t+1 − χbπ̂t−1 − κc(σ(1− θ)
−1(ŷt − θŷt−1) + ϕŷt + µ̂t)],
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where, due to the linear-quadratic nature of our policy problem, the expectations variables are a
linear function of the states which include π̂t and ŷt, while the value function, Vt, will be quadratic
in the states. The first order condition for R̂t is
ω3∆R̂t − λ
1
t
[
1
1− θ
∂Etŷt+1
∂R̂t
+
1
σ
∂Etπ̂t+1
∂R̂t
−
1
σ
]
− λ2tχfβ
∂Etπ̂t+1
∂R̂t
+ β
∂EtVt+1
∂R̂t
= 0.
the first order condition for output ŷt is given by,
ω1
1− θ
(
1
1− θ
ŷt −
θ
1− θ
ŷt−1 + ξ̂t
)
+ ω2
(
ŷt −
σ
ϕ
ξ̂t
)
+λ1t
[
1 + θ
1− θ
−
1
1− θ
∂Etŷt+1
∂ŷt
−
1
σ
∂Etπ̂t+1
∂ŷt
]
+λ2t
[
π̂t − χfβEtπ̂t+1 − χbπ̂t−1 −
κcσ
1− θ
− κcϕ
]
+ β
∂EtVt+1
∂ŷt
= 0.
and the first order condition for inflation, π̂t, is
ωπ,st π̂t + ωπ,st
ζα−1
(1− ζ)
(π̂t − π̂t−1)− λ
1
t
[
1
1− θ
∂Etŷt+1
∂π̂t
+
1
σ
∂Etπ̂t+1
∂π̂t
]
+λ2t
[
1− χfβ
∂Etπ̂t+1
∂π̂t
]
+ β
∂EtVt+1
∂π̂t
= 0.
In principle, we could use the first order conditions for ŷt and π̂t to eliminate the LMs, λ
1
t and λ
2
t ,
from the first order condition for R̂t to get an implied instrument rule under discretion. However,
to write such an instrument rule is complicated and difficult to compare informatively with the
estimated simple rules.
Nevertheless, we can see that the implied instrument rule under discretion is a linear function
of the following arguments:
Rt = f(R̂t−1, π̂t, π̂t−1, ŷt, ŷt−1, ξ̂t, ẑt, µ̂t, ξ̂t−1, ẑt−1, µ̂t−1).
where the rule is a function of the contemporaneous values of all endogenous variables and all
states. However, one can manipulate this further, as in Clarida et al. (1999) by substitution of
either the IS curve or the NKPC, to show that the interest rate is a function of expected inflation
and output, current inflation and output and all states,
Rt = f(R̂t−1, Etπ̂t+1, π̂t, π̂t−1, Etŷt+1, ŷt, ŷt−1, ξ̂t, ẑt, µ̂t, ξ̂t−1, ẑt−1, µ̂t−1).
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Therefore, we proceed by estimating a very general interest rate rule containing all these
terms:
R̂t = ρ
R
stR̂t−1 + (1− ρ
R
st)
(
ψ1,st π̂t + ψ2,st ŷt + ψ3,st π̂t−1 + ψ4,st ŷt−1
+ψ5,stEtπ̂t+1 + ψ6,stEtŷt+1
)
+ψ7ẑt + ψ8µ̂t + ψ9ξ̂t + ψ10ẑt−1 + ψ11µ̂t−1 + ψ12ξ̂t−1 + ε
R
t ,
where we allow Markov-switching in parameters of lagged interest rates, expected, current and
lagged output and inflation, and we also allow the interest rate to directly respond shocks. Specifi-
cally, the priors of ρRst ,ψ1,st and ψ2,st are the same as we reported in Table 1 in the paper, while for
the priors of other parameters they are set to follow the normal distribution with wide standard
deviations.
We find that the likelihood at the mode of this general rule is superior to discretion, but it
is over-parameterised that discretion remains dominant in terms of marginal data density, which
is the correct criterion to compare different models within the Bayesian estimation framework.
Therefore, generalising the interest rate rule tends to improve the likelihood, but at the cost of
increasing model complexity.
Table E1: Model Comparison
Model likelihood at mode penalty MDD
Discretion -320.023 -50.283 -367.407
Rule - Parameters -320.761 -56.887 -375.859
Rule - Target -331.301 -48.834 -384.169
Very General Rule -303.618 -81.727 -376.615
Note: penalty is calculated as d2 ln(2π) +
1
2 ln (|V |) , where d is the dimension of the parameter
vector and |V | is the determinant of covariance matrix of the posterior.
Table E1 decomposes the marginal data density (which underpins the Bayes factor com-
parisons of model fit) into the likelihood at the mode and the penalty associated with over-
parameterisation. The results suggest that, in terms of likelihood, discretion marginally improves
upon a simple rule with switches in parameters, but that the latter is penalised due to the larger
number of parameters such that discretion is ‘decisively’ preferred to the simple rule in terms of
Bayes Factors.2 The rule with switches in the inflation target has fewer parameters and so faces
a milder penalty, but the underlying likelihood is less favourable which again accounts for the
relative success of discretion.
2Discretion requires estimation of the 4 objective function parameters (ω1, ω2, ω3 and ωπ) while the simple rule
contains 3 parameters (ρR, ψ1 and ψ2) which vary across regimes making 6 policy parameters in total.
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